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Abstract 
This paper studies the interaction between adverse selection, liquidity risk and beliefs 
about systemic risk in determining market liquidity, asset prices and welfare. Even a 
small amount of adverse selection in the asset market can lead to fire-sale pricing and 
possibly to a market breakdown if it is accompanied by a flight-to-liquidity, a 
misassessment of systemic risk, or uncertainty about asset values. The ability to trade 
based on private information improves welfare if adverse selection does not lead to a 
market breakdown. Informed trading allows financial institutions to reduce idiosyncratic 
risks, but it exacerbates their exposure to systemic risk. Further, I show that in a market 
equilibrium, financial institutions overinvest into risky illiquid assets (relative to the 
constrained efficient allocation), which creates systemic externalities. Also, I explore 
possible policy responses and discuss their effectiveness. 
JEL classification: G01, G11, D82  
Bank classification: Financial institutions; Financial markets; Financial stability 
Résumé 
L’auteure étudie l’interaction entre l’antisélection, le risque de liquidité et les croyances 
concernant le risque systémique dans la détermination du degré de liquidité du marché, 
des prix des actifs et du niveau de bien-être. La présence, même faible, d’antisélection sur 
le marché des actifs peut entraîner l’effondrement des prix de vente, voire la défaillance 
du marché si elle s’accompagne d’une ruée vers la liquidité, d’une évaluation incorrecte 
du risque systémique ou d’une incertitude quant à la valeur des actifs. La possibilité de 
négocier sur la base d’informations privées accroît le bien-être lorsque l’antisélection ne 
mène pas à la défaillance du marché. Les transactions entre opérateurs informés 
permettent aux institutions financières de réduire les risques idiosyncrasiques, mais elles 
accentuent l’exposition de ces dernières au risque systémique. L’auteure montre 
également qu’en situation d’équilibre de marché (par rapport à une situation d’efficience 
allocative sous contraintes), les institutions financières surinvestissent dans des actifs 
risqués peu liquides, ce qui crée des effets externes systémiques. Enfin, l’auteure examine 
diverses interventions possibles de l’État et analyse leur efficacité. 
Classification JEL : G01, G11, D82 




In the recent crisis of 2007-2009, trading in some ￿nancial markets was dramatically reduced
or stopped completely. The following questions emerged: What caused market freezes? For
trades that did occur, why were the assets traded at a signi￿cant discount? How were
problems in a relatively small part of ￿nancial market ampli￿ed into the systemic crisis?
The prevalent explanations focus on the increased uncertainty and information asymme-
tries about asset values. In particular, the di¢ culty in assessing the fundamental value of
securities may lead to adverse selection problems. A ￿ ight-to-liquidity and a misassessment
of systemic risk can further amplify the adverse selection problem into a severe ￿nancial
crisis.
In this paper, I develop a model to analyze the interaction between adverse selection,
liquidity risk and beliefs about systemic risk in determining market liquidity, asset prices
and welfare. I characterize the ￿nancial institutions￿portfolio choices between safe and risky
assets when systemic risk is anticipated, and examine how their beliefs may contribute to
market freezes.
In my model, ￿nancial institutions (investors) are ex-ante identical but ex-post di⁄erent
with respect to realizations of liquidity shocks and investment quality. Preference for liquid-
ity is characterized by Diamond-Dybvig [21] type of preferences: investors need liquidity in
period one or in period two, depending on whether they receive a liquidity shock in period
one. In period zero, investors choose the portfolio allocation between the safe asset and the
risky long-term asset with an idiosyncratic payo⁄. In period one, they privately observe
their asset quality, and then risky assets can be traded in the market. The investors who
have not experienced a liquidity shock are buyers in the asset market, while the sellers are
those who have low quality assets or have received a liquidity shock.
Market liquidity is characterized by the cost (in terms of the foregone payo⁄) of selling
a long-term asset before its maturity.1 Two factors contribute to illiquidity in the market:
a shortage of safe assets and adverse selection (characterized by the fraction of low quality
assets in the market). On one hand, market liquidity depends on the amount of the safe asset
1This characterization of liquidity is similar to Eisfeldt [25], where liquidity is described as the cost of
transferring the value of expected future payo⁄s from long-term assets into the current income.
2held by investors that is available to buy risky assets from liquidity traders. Following the
Allen and Gale ([9], [11]) "cash-in-the-market" framework, the market price is determined
by the lesser of the following two amounts: expected payo⁄and the amount of the safe asset
available from buyers per unit of assets sold. Therefore, this "cash-in-the-market" pricing
may lead to market prices below fundamentals if there is not enough cash (safe assets) to
absorb asset trades. On the other hand, market liquidity depends on the quality of assets
traded in the market. In particular, adverse selection can cause market illiquidity if assets
sold in the market are likely to be of low quality (as in Eisfeldt [25]).
The long-term investment is risky not only because of its uncertain quality but also
because of the cost associated with its premature liquidation or sale. Therefore, investors
are exposed to the market liquidity risk through their holding of long-term assets. Holdings
of the safe asset provide partial insurance against the possibility of a liquidity shock as
well as against low asset quality realizations. In addition to the value as means of storage,
the safe asset has value as means for reallocating risky assets from investors who have
experienced a liquidity shock to those who have not. This is similar to the concept of
liquidity value for ability to transfer resources in Kiyotaki and Moore [35].2
As a benchmark, I examine portfolio choice when investors have private information
about their investment quality but the identity of investors hit by a liquidity shock is public
information. Then I analyze the situation when the investor￿ s type (both liquidity needs
and asset quality) is private information. In the latter case investors can take advantage of
their private information by selling the low-payo⁄ investments and keeping the high quality
ones. This generates the lemons problem: buyers do not know whether an asset is sold
because of its low quality or because the seller experienced a sudden need for liquidity.3
There are two possible states of the economy: normal times and a crisis. The crisis
state is characterized by a larger fraction of low quality assets in the market and a higher
preference for liquidity relative to normal times.4 The aggregate uncertainty about the state
2This is also similar to Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [3] and Diamond and Rajan [22] where one of the
motives for holding liquid assets by banks is potential future acquisitions at ￿re-sale prices.
3This setting is di⁄erent from models where investors have private information about aggregate (common)
payo⁄ and information can be revealed through trading.
4This characterization is consistent with the fact that liquidity crises tend to be associated with economic
3of the economy captures systemic risk, while idiosyncratic realizations of liquidity shocks
and asset payo⁄s represent individual exposures to the systemic risk.5 When the economy
is in the normal state, adverse selection does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect market liquidity. If the
market is liquid then informed investors can gain from trading on private information at
the expense of liquidity traders.6
In the crisis state, adverse selection leads to depressed asset prices and possibly to a
breakdown of market trading. There are two types of equilibria depending on trading
behavior during the crisis state: (I) with market trading when both high and low quality
assets are sold, and (II) with the market breakdown. The type I equilibrium is characterized
by asset price volatility across states with ￿re-sale pricing in the crisis state. It prevails,
as a unique equilibrium, when a crisis is relatively mild (preference for liquidity and the
fraction of low quality assets are relatively low). In a type II equilibrium, in the crisis state
investors with high quality assets choose not to participate which causes market breakdown
and liquidity hoarding. This type prevails, as a unique equilibrium, when a crisis is severe
(preference for liquidity and the fraction of low quality assets are su¢ ciently high). In
between, there is a possibility of multiple equilibria when both types coexist. In this case
the equilibrium type depends on investors￿initial beliefs about the average quality of assets
sold in the market.
The ability to trade based on private information about asset quality increases aggre-
gate welfare if adverse selection does not lead to the market breakdown. In normal times,
informed trading is welfare bene￿cial since it allows ￿nancial institutions to share idiosyn-
cratic risks through market trading.7 However, more risk-sharing leads to more risk-taking
by ￿nancial institutions which may result in signi￿cant losses during crises if market trading
downturns. (Eisfeldt [25] and Eisfeldt and Rampini [26])
5So investors are exposed to the systemic risk through their holdings of long-term risky assets.
6Usually liquidity traders are modeled as "noise traders" whose endowments and preference for consump-
tion are left unspeci￿ed. Modeling liquidity traders as consumers with well-speci￿ed preferences allows one
to examine the impact of informed trading on welfare.
7In this setting, the bene￿ts from informed trading are only from risk sharing, there is no information
revelation since investors have private information about idiosyncratic realizations of liquidity shocks and
investment quality. All aggregate uncertainty is revealed in period one before market trading takes place.
4halts.8 Therefore, informed trading reduces idiosyncratic risks of ￿nancial institutions but
it induces and exacerbates systemic risk by causing market breakdowns.
Furthermore, I show that even a small amount of adverse selection can lead to the
equilibrium with no market trading during a crisis if it is accompanied by any of the follow-
ing phenomena: an increase in liquidity preference during the crisis9, underestimating the
systemic risk, or uncertainty about asset values.
Increase in liquidity preference On the one hand, a higher preference for liquidity
alleviates adverse selection since assets are more likely to be sold due to the seller￿ s liquidity
needs than due to their low quality. On the other hand, higher liquidity preference implies
lower demand for (illiquid) risky assets. If demand is su¢ ciently low then the asset price
is determined by cash in the market (i.e., by liquidity available in the market to absorb
the asset trades) rather than by the asset￿ s expected payo⁄. Hence, an increase in liquidity
preference can lead to ￿re-sale pricing and possibly to a complete breakdown of trade.
Underestimating systemic risk Adverse selection is likely to cause a more severe crisis
if systemic risk is underestimated. If the crisis is (or believed to be) a rare event, then
￿nancial institutions may not hold enough safe (liquid) assets to cushion the impact of a
systemic shock when it occurs.
Uncertainty about asset values The Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) about the frac-
tion of low quality assets in the market can also cause market illiquidity. In this case,
investors￿beliefs about the extent of adverse selection are crucial: if investors believe there
may be too many low quality assets in the market, then the market breaks down.
I show that the investment allocation is not constrained e¢ cient:10 there is overinvest-
8This is similar to the Hirshleifer e⁄ect when more information reduces risk sharing.
9The higher preference for liquidity during the crisis can viewed as precautionary liquidity hoarding due to
the tightening in funding liquidity (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen [15] for dividing the concept of liquidity
into two categories: funding liquidity and market liquidity).
10It is known since Greenwald and Stiglitz [31] that the market equilibrium is not constraint e¢ cient if
there are information imperfections. What is interesting is the source of ine¢ ciencies, and the systemic
externalities it creates. For example, Bhattacharya and Gale [12] show that even in the absence of aggregate
liquidity shocks, heterogeneity in liquidity preferences leads to underinvestment into liquid assets. In my
model, underinvestment into liquid (safe) assets is caused by adverse selection. If there is no adverse selection,
￿nancial institutions will hold safe assets above socially optimal level.
5ment into risky assets relative to the constrained e¢ cient investment allocation. In the
market equilibrium, investors do not take into account the e⁄ect of their investment choice
on market prices, thereby creating systemic externalities. Because of adverse selection, there
are more assets traded in the market, in particular, more assets of low quality. To absorb
this trading, more liquidity (safe assets) is needed. The social planner allocation increases
the consumption of liquidity investors and investors with low quality assets which reduces
ex-ante consumption volatility and improves aggregate welfare.
There are policy implications for government interventions during a crisis as well as for
preemptive policy regulations. The e⁄ectiveness of policy responses during crises depends
on which ampli￿cation e⁄ect contributes to a market breakdown. If it is due to an increase
in liquidity preferences or to a small probability of the crisis then liquidity provision can
restore the trading. However, if the no-trade outcome is caused by a large fraction of lemons
or by the Knightian uncertainty about it, then it is more e⁄ective to remove these low
quality assets from the market. The preemptive policy response is an ex-ante requirement
of larger liquidity holdings, which prevents market breakdowns during crises, especially if the
economy is in the multiple equilibria range. Also, I examine the e⁄ect of a liquidity provision
during the crisis when it is ￿nanced by an ex-ante tax on holdings of risky assets. Such tax
corrects the moral hazard problem associated with government interventions during crises
and increases market liquidity which makes market breakdowns less likely.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the related literature.
Section 3 describes the model environment. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and
analyzes the role of government. Section 5 applies the model to the recent ￿nancial crisis
and discusses possible policy responses and their e⁄ectiveness. Section 6 concludes the
paper. All results are proved in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
As has been demonstrated in the line of work started by Akerlof [5], asymmetric information
between buyers and sellers can lead to a complete breakdown of trade. Morris and Shin
[40], Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman [13], Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen [32], Acharya,
6Gale and Yorulmazer [1], Chiu and Koeppl [19], and Malherbe [39] provide explanations for
market freezes and ine¢ cient asset liquidation based on asymmetric information.11
My paper complements this literature on adverse selection in ￿nancial markets by ac-
commodating market frictions such as aggregate uncertainty about liquidity preferences and
asset returns in addition to asymmetric information about asset quality. Also, I explore the
role of investors beliefs about asset values and the likelihood of a crisis as additional sources
of market freezes. In particular, the liquidity holdings are determined endogenously, and
the market price depends not only on the asset￿ s average quality but also on the amount
of liquidity available in the market. Therefore, a market breakdown can be caused by a
shortage of liquid assets during the crisis, which results in depressed asset prices and causes
non-participation of investors with high quality assets.12
Allen and Gale ([9], [10], [11]) developed a liquidity-based approach to study ￿nancial
crises. When supply and demand for liquidity are inelastic in the short run, a small degree of
aggregate uncertainty can have a large e⁄ect on asset prices and lead to ￿nancial instability.
Allen and Carletti ([8], [7]) analyze the role of aggregate liquidity shortages in ￿nancial
crises. Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer [3] and Diamond and Rajan [22] show that banks
may hoard liquidity (above the socially optimal level) in anticipation of future gains from
acquiring assets at ￿re-sale prices. In my paper, the market breakdown is a result of
overinvestment in illiquid risky assets which causes a shortage of liquidity during crises.13
The importance of Knightian uncertainty in ￿nancial crises has been emphasized by
Caballero [16], Caballero and Krishnamurthy [17], Krishnamurthy [38], Easley and O￿ Hara
[24] and Uhlig [43]. In particular, Uhlig [43] develops a model of a systemic bank run with
two variants: uncertainty aversion and adverse selection. He shows that only the former
generates the following feature of a ￿nancial crisis: a larger share of troubled ￿nancial
institutions results in a steeper asset price discount. Contrary to Uhlig [43], in my model
11Allen, Babus, Carletti [6] provide an extensive survey of recent papers that study the role of asymmetric
information in credit markets.
12This unlike Malherbe [39], where agents self-insure through the ex-ante hoarding of non-productive but
liquid assets, which reduces ex-post market participation and dries up market liquidity.
13Kahn and Wagner [34] develop a model where ine¢ ciency in bank liquidity holdings depends on the
relative costs of raising external liquidity. In particular, if liquidity supply is elastic, then there is a bias
towards illiquid holdings.
7it is possible that the adverse selection can lead to a larger price discount even if there
is no Knightian uncertainty about asset values. In terms of policy responses to market
breakdowns due to adverse selection, my paper is related to Chiu and Koeppl [19] and
Philippon and Skreta [41].
My paper contributes to the literature by combining aggregate uncertainty about liq-
uidity risk with aggregate uncertainty and asymmetric information about asset returns.
My model builds on the cash-in-the-market framework developed by Allen and Gale which
is well suited for studying ￿nancial crises accompanied by liquidity dry-ups. This frame-
work captures the maturity transformation by banks (as in Diamond and Dybvig [21]) as
well as the exposure of long-term assets to market liquidity risk through the ￿cash-in-the-
market" pricing. I introduce asymmetric information in this framework, which generates
an additional component of illiquidity due to the adverse selection.
3 Model
I consider a model with three dates indexed by t = 0;1;2. There is a continuum of ex-ante
identical ￿nancial institutions (investors14, for short) of measure one. There is only one
good in the economy which can be used for consumption and investment. All investors are
endowed with one unit of good at date t = 0, and nothing at the later dates. There are two
states of nature s = 1 and s = 2 that are revealed at date t = 1. State 1 is the normal state
and state 2 is the crisis state. These states are realized with ex-ante probabilities (1 ￿ q)
and q, respectively. (I will also use the notation q1 = 1 ￿ q and q2 = q.) The states di⁄er
with respect to aggregate (market) productivity and the probability of a liquidity shock.
There are more high-quality investments and less investors are a⁄ected by liquidity shocks
in the normal state than in the crisis state.
14Financial institutions can also be referred to as banks. These are the market-based ￿nancial institutions
(shadow banking) such as investment banks, money-market mutual funds, and mortgage brokers.
83.1 Preferences
Investors consume at date one or two, depending on whether they receive a liquidity shock
at date one. The probability of receiving a liquidity shock in period one in state s is denoted
by ￿s. (So ￿s is also the fraction of investors hit by a liquidity shock.) Investors who receive
a liquidity shock have to sell or liquidate their risky long-term asset holdings and consume
all their wealth in period one. They are e⁄ectively early consumers who value consumption
only at date t = 1. The rest are the late consumers who value the consumption only at date
t = 2. I will refer to the early consumers as liquidity investors, and to the late consumers
as informed or non-liquidity investors.15
Investors have Diamond-Dybvig [21] type of preferences:
U(c1;c2)] = ￿su(c1s) + (1 ￿ ￿s)u(c2s) (1)
where cts is the consumption at dates t = 1;2 in state s. In each period, investors have
logarithmic utility: u(cts) = logcts.
3.2 Investment technology
Investors have access to two types of constant returns investment technologies. One is a
storage technology (also called a safe asset or cash), which has zero net return: one unit
of safe asset pays out one unit of consumption good in the next period. The other type
of technology is a long-term risky investment project (also called a risky asset). The risky
asset pays o⁄ in period two e R 2 fRH;RLg per unit of investment which represents an
idiosyncratic (investment speci￿c) productivity. The risky investment with payo⁄ RH is
called a high-quality asset while an investment with payo⁄ RL is called a low-quality asset
(lemon).
The quality of assets is independent across investors. Each investor i has a choice of
starting his own investment project i by investing a fraction of his endowment. The investor
15Note both types of investors receive private information about quality of their assets. Assuming that
liquidity investors are informed is without loss of generality since they cannot take advantage of this infor-
mation. The structure of investment payo⁄ and information are described in the next two subsections.
9can start only one project, and each project has only one owner.16 The idiosyncratic payo⁄
of each investment i is an independent realization of a random variable e Ri that takes two
values: a low value RL with probability ￿s and a high value RH with probability (1 ￿ ￿s)
where s 2 f1;2g is the state. In the normal state, the fraction of low quality assets is small:
￿1 << 0:5. In the crisis state, the fraction of low quality assets is larger : ￿2 > ￿1.
Remark 1 An alternative speci￿cation17 is that the payo⁄ of each investment i consists
of two components: e Ri(s) = ￿i(s)<L + (1 ￿ ￿i(s))<H; where ￿i(s) represents the exposure
to an asset with low payo⁄ <L. The individual exposure ￿i(s) is a random variable that
takes two values: a high value ￿h with probability ￿s and a low value ￿l with probability
(1 ￿ ￿s); where s 2 f1;2g is the state. Then the market (aggregate) exposure is ￿m(s) =
￿s￿h+(1 ￿ ￿s)￿l and the market payo⁄ is Rm(s) = ￿m(s)<L+(1 ￿ ￿m(s))<H. As before,
state 1 is the normal state where the fraction of low quality assets is small. State 2 is
the crisis state with more low quality assets: ￿2 > ￿1, so that Rm(s = 1) > Rm(s = 2).
To express this speci￿cation in terms of the previous one denote the payo⁄ of low-quality
investment as RL, i.e., RL ￿ ￿h<L + (1 ￿ ￿h)<H. Similarly, the high-quality investment
payo⁄, denoted by RH; is RH ￿ ￿l<L + (1 ￿ ￿l)<H.
The expected payo⁄ of each individual risky project in state s is denoted by Rs =
￿sRL + (1 ￿ ￿s)RH with RL < 1 < RH. The expected payo⁄ when the economy is in the
normal state is higher than when it is in the crisis state: R1 > R2. The expected payo⁄
before state is realized is denoted by R = (1 ￿ q)R1 + qR2 with R > 1.
The long-term asset can be liquidated prematurely at date t = 1, in which case, one unit
of the high (low) quality asset yields rH (rL) units of the good, and 0 ￿ rL = RL < rH < 1.
This private liquidation technology can be interpreted as an outside funding option. Suppose
there are (outside) experts who have an ability to value assets but have limited demand and
their services are expensive. Alternatively, this liquidation technology can be interpreted
16I assume that several agents cannot coinvest into one project in order to diversify away the idiosyncratic
risk. This assumption can be justi￿ed by the beni￿ts of securitization which re￿ ect the limitations of ex-ante
project pooling.
17This speci￿cation is equivalent to the above (although more complicated) but it makes the model more
applicable to the ABS market.
10as costly restructuring of assets or terminating loans before maturity (similarly to Heider,
Hoerova, and Holthausen [32]).18 The holdings of the two-period risky asset can also be
traded in the ￿nancial market at date t = 1. Figure 1 summarizes the payo⁄ structure.
time 0 1 2
safe asset 1 1 1
risky asset 1 rk Rk
Figure 1. Payo⁄s, k = L;H
3.3 Information and Timeline
At date t = 0, each investor makes an investment choice between the two investment
technologies, risky and safe, in proportion x and (1￿x), respectively. Investors choose their
asset holdings to maximize their expected utility.
At date t = 1, liquidity shocks and the aggregate state are realized, and the ￿nancial
market opens. Investors privately observe their asset payo⁄s and liquidity needs. The supply
of risky assets comes from the investors who have experienced a liquidity shock, whereas
the demand comes from those who have not.19 Any investor can liquidate his investment
project at date one, receiving rk units of the good per unit of investment (where k = L;H
depending on whether the project is of high or low quality).
Note that the markets are incomplete since there are two frictions in this economy: asym-
metric information about asset quality and liquidity shocks, which generates four possible
types of investors in each state. The holdings of the safe asset provides partial insurance
against the liquidity risk as well as the asset quality risk. The di⁄erence between returns
on risky and safe assets can also be viewed as a liquidity premium.
The timeline of the model is summarized in the ￿gure below.
18I assume the lemons can be liquidated at the same value as their payo⁄. The important assumption is
that lemons have su¢ ciently low payo⁄ so that there is no losses from premature liquidation. A simple case
is when RL = rL = 0. It can be assumed that there are gains from restructuring, i.e. rL ￿ RL - it does not
a⁄ect the results. Also, the liquidation values rk can be state dependent, it would not qualitatively a⁄ect
any results. Appendix 7.1 describes additional assumptions imposed on parameters values.
19Informed investors can simultaneously be sellers and buyers in the market. This assumption does not
a⁄ect any results.
11Figure 2. Timeline
I will consider two cases. In the ￿rst case, it is public information which investors have
experienced a liquidity shock. The liquidity investors sell or liquidate their holdings of the
risky asset in order to consume as much as possible in period one. In the second case,
the identity of investors hit by a liquidity shock is private information. Therefore, after
privately observing investment payo⁄s, non-liquidity investors can take advantage of their
information by selling low quality projects in the market at date t = 1. Buyers can not
distinguish whether an investor is selling his asset because of its low payo⁄ or because of
his liquidity needs. This generates adverse selection problem, and leads to a discount on
the investments sold in the market at date t = 1.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Equilibrium without Adverse Selection (benchmark model)
First, as a benchmark, I consider the case with no adverse selection where the identity of
investors who have experienced a liquidity shock is public information.20 Then all risky
assets at date t = 1 are sold only by liquidity traders who cannot wait for the maturity of
their investments at date t = 2.
Since realizations of asset quality are independent from realization of liquidity shocks,
the expected payo⁄of the risky asset sold in period one is Rs in state s. All risky assets sold
20In this setting, absence of adverse selection refers to inability of investors to trade based on their private
information about asset quality. In the equilibrium, both bad and good assets are traded in the market in
period one, however, they are sold only by liquidity investors.
12at t = 1 are aggregated in the market, therefore, the variance of an asset bought at date
t = 1 is zero (since all investments have idiosyncratic payo⁄s).21 Therefore, the expected
return on risky assets bought in period one is Rs=ps, where ps is the market price in state
s. Late consumers are willing to buy risky assets at date t = 1 if the market price ps is
less than or equal to the expected payo⁄ Rs. The early consumers are willing to sell their
projects if the market price ps is greater than the liquidation value of their asset: rk.22
The consumption of early consumers in state s is denoted by c1k (s) and the consumption
of late consumers in state s is denoted by c2k (s) where k = L;H refers to the quality of







4 ￿s (￿s logc1L (s) + (1 ￿ ￿s)logc1H (s))
+(1 ￿ ￿s)(￿s logc2L (s) + (1 ￿ ￿s)logc2H (s))
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5 (2)




1 ￿ x + psx if ps > rk;
1 ￿ x + rkx if ps ￿ rk:




xRk + x1sRs if ps > rk;
xRk + (1 ￿ x) if ps ￿ rk:
where x1s is the demand for risky assets at t = 1 in state s:
x1s
8
> > > <
> > > :
= 1￿x






if ps = Rs;
= 0 if otherwise.
(3)
If the market price ps ￿ rH then all liquidity investors with high quality assets choose to
liquidate their assets so that only lemons (assets with low payo⁄s) are traded in the market.
Then the expected payo⁄ of a traded risky asset is rL. Therefore, there is no trade since no
one is willing to buy these low quality assets (x1s = 0).
21Assuming the law of large numbers holds. As shown by Judd (1985), one can ￿nd a measure that makes
a law of large numbers valid for a continuum of i.i.d. random variables.
22For simplicity, I assume that if the asset price is equal to the liquidation value, investors choose to
liquidate their assets rather than to sell them. This assumption rules out equilibria with partial pooling.
13Therefore, aggregate demand at t = 1 in state s is given by
D(s)
8
> > > <
> > > :
= (1 ￿ ￿s) 1￿x
ps if rH < ps < Rs;
2
h
0;(1 ￿ ￿s) 1￿x
ps
i
if ps = Rs;
= 0 if otherwise,
(4)
and aggregate supply at t = 1 in state s is given by
S (s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿sx if ps > rH;
￿s￿sx if rL < ps ￿ rH;
0 if ps ￿ rL:
(5)
Then market clearing conditions are
￿sxps ￿ (1 ￿ ￿s)(1 ￿ x): (6)
The price in state s is equal to the lesser of the amount of cash available from buyers
per unit of assets sold and the expected payo⁄,
ps = min
￿





This cash-in-the-market pricing captures the e⁄ect of liquidity on asset pricing. When
there is su¢ cient liquidity in the market, the price is equal to the asset￿ s expected payo⁄.
However, when liquidity is scarce, the price is determined by the holdings of safe asset
(cash) available in the market.
The aggregate uncertainty about the fraction of investors a⁄ected by liquidity shocks
generates asset price volatility: the equilibrium market price is lower during the crisis than
in normal times (p2 < p1).23 The investment allocation x is smaller than the ￿rst-best
investment allocation since the investment quality is not observable.24
4.2 Equilibrium with Adverse Selection
Now suppose the identity of liquidity investors is private information. Then, after observing
investment payo⁄, non-liquidity investors can take advantage of their private information
23This result is similar to Allen and Gale [9].
24See Appendix 7.2 for the proof.
14by selling low productive investments in the market at date t = 1. This generates the
adverse selection problem, and therefore leads to a discount on the price of risky assets sold
at t = 1.
An investor who buys a risky asset at date t = 1 does not know whether it is sold
due to a liquidity shock or because of its low payo⁄. Buyers believe that with probability
￿s
￿s+(1￿￿s)￿s investment is sold due to a liquidity shock, and with probability
(1￿￿s)￿s
￿s+(1￿￿s)￿s
it sold because of its low quality. Hence, buyers believe that the expected payo⁄ of risky
assets sold in state s is b Rs,
b Rs =
￿s
￿s + (1 ￿ ￿s)￿s
Rs +
(1 ￿ ￿s)￿s
￿s + (1 ￿ ￿s)￿s
RL: (8)
The non-liquidity investors are willing to buy risky assets at t = 1 if the market price
ps is less than or equal to the expected payo⁄ b Rs. Therefore, the demand for risky assets
at t = 1 is given by
x1s
8
> > > <
> > > :
= 1￿x






if rH < ps = b Rs;
= 0 if otherwise.
(9)
The liquidity investors are willing to sell their investment if the market price ps is greater
than the liquidation value of their assets. If the market price is less than or equal to the
liquidation value of high quality assets (ps ￿ rH) then only low quality assets are traded in
the market with the expected payo⁄ of rL. Since no one is willing to buy these low quality
assets, there is no trade. Similarly, if the fraction of low quality assets ￿s is su¢ ciently large
so that the expected payo⁄ b Rs ￿ rH, then there is no market trading as well.
If there is trading in state s, the market clearing conditions are
8s = 1;2 : (￿s + (1 ￿ ￿s)￿s)xps ￿ (1 ￿ ￿s)(1 ￿ x): (10)
Note, ability to trade based on private information increases the supply of risky assets.
The market price in state s can be expressed as the lesser of the amount of cash per
unit of assets sold and the expected payo⁄ b Rs,
ps = min
￿
(1 ￿ ￿s)(1 ￿ x)




15Market liquidity is characterized by the cost of selling long-term assets before maturity,
C(s) =
b Rs ￿ ps
b Rs
(12)
A lower cost implies higher market liquidity. Therefore, there is a trade-o⁄ between asset
payo⁄ and liquidity: risky assets have larger expected payo⁄ but there is a cost associate
with premature liquidation or sale of the asset. This cost is increasing in the amount of
adverse selection in the market.
Denote aggregate liquidity holdings in state s by L(s);
L(s) = (1 ￿ ￿s)(1 ￿ x): (13)
Even though the safe asset has lower expected return, it has additional value for its ability to
reallocate risky assets from liquidity investors to non-liquidity ones. This value of liquidity
is characterized by the payo⁄ on risky asset bought in period one: b Rs=ps ￿ 1.
I distinguish two types of equilibria: type I with market trading in both states, and type
II with a market breakdown in the crisis state.25 Type I is a pooling equilibrium where
both high and low quality assets are sold in each state. Type II is a separating equilibrium
where in the crisis liquidity investors choose to liquidate their high quality assets rather
than to sell them, which leads to the no-trade outcome.
Proposition 1 If the crisis is mild (￿2 and ￿2 are relatively small) then there is a unique
type I equilibrium with market price volatility across states: p1 > p2. If the crisis is severe
(￿2 and ￿2 are su¢ ciently large) then there is a unique type II equilibrium with no trade in
the crisis state. For the intermediate range of parameters ￿2 and ￿2, there is a possibility
of multiple equilibria: one of each type. In the case of multiple equilibria, in the type I
equilibrium market liquidity and liquidity holdings are larger, and the expected utility is
higher than in the type II equilibrium.
Adverse selection leads to the increased price volatility across states because a larger
share of lemons in the market during the crisis. Therefore, market liquidity is larger in the
25Equilibria with partial pooling are ruled out by assuming that if the asset price is equal to the liquidation
value, investors choose to liquidate their assets rather than to sell them. This assumption is for simplicity
only, and does not qualitatively a⁄ect the results.
16normal state than in the crisis state. Also, the payo⁄ on the risky asset bought in period
one is larger in the crisis state relative to the normal state: b R2=p2 > b R1=p1. This re￿ ects
the ￿re-sale phenomenon when the value of liquidity is high during crises.
However, the scarcity of liquidity holdings in the market could lead to a market break-
down, in which case the role of the safe asset is reduced to the storage technology. If there






so that the ex-
pected payo⁄ b R2 falls below the liquidation value rH, then the market breaks down. As
a result, the value of the (liquid) safe asset is lower in the type II equilibrium than in the
type I equilibrium.
A high preference for liquidity (￿2) can also lead to a breakdown of trade. On the
one hand, higher preference for liquidity alleviates the adverse selection and increases the
expected payo⁄ since assets are more likely to be sold due to seller￿liquidity needs than
due to their low quality. On the other hand, higher liquidity preference implies lower
demand for risky assets. If demand is su¢ ciently low then the asset price is determined by
liquidity available in the market to absorb the asset trades (rather than by the expected
payo⁄). Therefore, an increase in liquidity preference during the crisis may amplify the
adverse selection problem by pushing the asset prices further down, possibly to the extent
of causing a market breakdown. This is consistent with the asset ￿re-sales when depressed
prices re￿ ect the di¢ culty of ￿nding buyers during the crisis.
For some range of parameters, two types of equilibria coexist. These are sunspot equilib-
ria when the equilibrium type is determined by investors￿self-ful￿lling beliefs. In particular,
if investors believe there is no trade during the crisis than they hold less of the safe asset.
Then if the crisis state is realized, there is not enough liquidity to absorb the informed
trading, so the market does indeed break down. Note that the market breakdown is caused
by aggregate overinvestment into the risky long-term asset. Furthermore, an equilibrium
with market breakdown is (ex-ante26) ine¢ cient since it achieves a lower expected utility
relative to the equilibrium with market trading during the crisis.
26Note, ex-post Pareto e¢ ciency is violated for investors with high quality assets in the normal state.
174.3 Welfare Implications
In the setting where trading based on private information is not possible, the market pro-
vides insurance only against liquidity risk. So, there are possible welfare gains from allowing
investors to bene￿t from private information on their asset quality. I show that informed
trading is welfare bene￿cial if it does not cause a market breakdown.
Proposition 2 The ability to trade based on private information increases expected utility
if there is market trading during the crisis and may decrease expected utility if there is
no trade during the crisis and the probability of a crisis is su¢ ciently large. The market
liquidity in each state and aggregate liquidity holdings are smaller in the equilibrium with
adverse selection than in the equilibrium without adverse selection.
Market trading in the interim period (t = 1) allows investors with low quality assets to
bene￿t from their private information at the expense of liquidity traders. The ability to
trade based on private information provides partial ex-ante insurance against a low asset
quality realization, which is especially relevant in the crisis state. As a result, it leads to
consumption smoothening across di⁄erent types of investors, and therefore improves ex-ante
welfare.
However, if there is no trade during a crisis then investors are left with their low quality
assets. So, the breakdown of trade prevents risk sharing. Moreover, some of the high quality
assets are liquidated before maturity contributing to a welfare loss. Therefore, the market
breakdown increases consumption volatility and leads to lower aggregate welfare.
Because it provides partial insurance, informed trading makes a risky investment ex-ante
more attractive, which is re￿ ected in lower aggregate liquidity holdings. Also, the supply
of risky assets in period t = 1 (in particular, the supply of low quality assets) is larger.
As a result, market prices are lower relative to the equilibrium without adverse selection.
Therefore, adverse selection leads to a less liquid market, i.e., the cost of selling a risky
asset before maturity is higher.
184.4 Numerical Example
Adverse Selection To illustrate the impact of adverse selection, consider the follow-
ing numerical example. The asset return parameters are RH = 1:2; rH = 0:5; RL = rL =
0:3, the fraction of low quality investments in the normal state is ￿1 = 0:05, the probability
of a liquidity shock in the normal state and the crisis state, respectively, are ￿1 = 0:2 and
￿2 = 0:3, and the probability of the crisis is q = 0:1. Figure 3a depicts the equilibrium
values of investment (x), prices (ps) and expected utility (EU) as a function of the fraction
of low quality assets in the crisis (￿2). The solid and dashed lines depict equilibrium values
with and without adverse selection.






































































Figure 3a. Equilibrium values of investment, prices and welfare as a function of ￿2.
As the fraction of low quality assets increases, the economy moves from the equilibrium
with trading to the equilibrium with no trade in the crisis state. If the fraction of lemons is
relatively small (less than 12%) then there is a unique equilibrium with market trading in
both states. If the fraction of lemons is su¢ ciently large (more than 14.2%) then there is a
unique equilibrium with no trade during the crisis. In between, the two types of equilibria
coexist.
If market trading breaks down, the safe asset has lower value and, as a result, the
holdings of risky assets is larger in a type II equilibrium relative to a type I equilibrium
and to an equilibrium without adverse selection. Adverse selection increases asset price
volatility, and results in an increase in welfare if there is market trading, otherwise, it leads
to a welfare loss.
Figure 3b depicts aggregate liquidity holdings in each state (L(s)), market liquidity as
the cost of foregone payo⁄ when assets are sold before maturity (C(s)), and the return on
19asset bought in the market (Rs=ps). The cost of selling assets before maturity and the
return on assets bought in period one are higher in the crisis state than in the normal state,
re￿ ecting the lack of liquidity in the market during the crisis.










































































































Figure 3b. Equilibrium values of market liquidity and asset returns as a function of ￿2.
Liquidity preference Now consider the e⁄ect of change in preferences for liquidity
during the crisis (￿2). As before, asset returns are RH = 1:2; rH = 0:5;RL = rL = 0:3, the
fraction of low quality investments in the normal state and in the crisis state, respectively,
are ￿1 = 0:05 and ￿2 = 0:25; the probability of the crisis is q = 0:1. The probability of a
liquidity shock in the normal state is ￿1 = 0:2. The ￿gure below illustrates the e⁄ect on
equilibrium values of an increase in liquidity preferences in the crisis state (￿2) from 0:2 to
0:4.
For ￿2 ￿ 0:31, there is a unique equilibrium with market trading in both states; for
￿2 > 0:32 there is a unique equilibrium with no trade during the crisis; otherwise, there
are multiple equilibria. The higher preference for liquidity magni￿es the e⁄ect of adverse
selection on asset prices and market liquidity. The di⁄erence in the payo⁄ of assets bought
in period one across two states (R2=p2 ￿ R1=p1) is increasing in the preference for liquidity





























































































































































Figure 5. Equilibrium values as a function of preference for liquidity during the crisis ￿2.
Figure 6 illustrates how the equilibrium type depends on the interaction between liq-
uidity preference (￿2) and the fraction of low quality assets (￿2). The ￿gure depicts the
possible equilibria regions for di⁄erent values of ￿2 and ￿2. Each point in the (￿2;￿2) plane
corresponds to a particular type of equilibria: type I or type II, except for the region with
multiple equilibria when both type I and II occur together.
Figure 6. Equilibrium types for di⁄erent values of ￿2 and ￿2:
As can be seen from the ￿gure, even a small amount of adverse selection (small ￿2) can
21lead to the no-trade outcome if the preference for liquidity is su¢ ciently high (large ￿2).
4.5 Properties of Equilibrium
In this subsection, I examine how changes in the probability (q) of the crisis state and beliefs
about it a⁄ect the equilibrium types and values.
4.5.1 Probability of the crisis state
Corollary 1. If the probability of the crisis state q is smaller then (i) investment allocation
is larger ; (ii) market prices are lower ; and (iii) expected utility is higher. If the economy
is in the type I equilibrium (with market trading in both states) then an increase in q may
lead to the type II equilibrium (with market breakdown in the crisis state).
The lower probability of the crisis state q implies that an asset is less likely to become a
lemon, which makes it ex-ante more pro￿table. Therefore, a lower q leads to a higher level
of investment x. More investment at date t = 0 implies larger supply and lower demand for
risky assets at date t = 1. As a result, market prices are lower in both equilibrium types.
The fact that the market price is increasing in the crisis probability makes it is possible to
move from one equilibrium type to the other.
Consider the numerical example discussed before. The asset return parameters are
RH = 1:2; rH = 0:5;RL = rL = 0:3, the fraction of low quality assets in the normal state is
￿1 = 0:05 and in the crisis state is ￿2 = 0:15; and the probability of a liquidity shock in the
normal state is ￿1 = 0:2; and in the crisis state is ￿2 = 0:3. Figure 7 depicts the equilibrium
values as a function of the probability of the crisis state q:
As the probability of the crisis increases, the economy moves from the unique equilibrium
with market breakdown to the multiple equilibria (for q > 11:8%), and then to the unique
equilibrium with market trading (for q > 20:6% ). So, if the crisis is a rare event then there
22is no trade during the crisis.





























































































































































Figure 7. Equilibrium values as a function of probability of the crisis state q.
Assume that the probability of the crisis q depends on the previously realized state, and
compare equilibria sequentially.27 The transition matrix is given by
2
4 1 ￿ q12 q12
1 ￿ q22 q22
3
5 where
qjk = Pr(s = skjs = sj);k;j 2 f1;2g is the conditional probability of transition from state
j to state k, and q22 > q12. So that it is more likely that the economy continues to stay in
the crisis state once it is realized.
Let us look again at the numerical example. Suppose q12 = 0:05 and q22 = 0:25. If the
economy is in the normal state then it is in the type II equilibrium with no trade. Once the
crisis occurs, probability of the crisis next period changes and investment allocations are
adjusted (liquidity holdings are increased), and the economy moves to the type I equilibrium.
So, the market trading is resumed next period even if the crisis persists.
Next I examine how equilibrium types depend on the interaction between liquidity pref-
27This assumption creates generic dynamics where each time period T = 1;2;::: consists of three subperi-
ods: t = 0;1;2.
23erence (￿2); probability of the crisis (q), and the fraction of lemons (￿2). Figure 8 illustrates
the possible equilibria regions for di⁄erent values of q and ￿2. Again, I consider two exam-
ples with the same values of RH = 1:2; rH = 0:5;RL = rL = 0:3 and di⁄erent values of ￿2:
￿2 = 0:1 and ￿2 = 0:2.
Figure 8. Equilibrium types for di⁄erent values of q and ￿2:
As illustrated in Figure 8, even a small amount of adverse selection (small ￿2) can lead to
the market breakdown if the crisis is a rare event (small q) and preference for liquidity is
high (large ￿2). The threshold value of the crisis probability when the economy moves from
trade to no-trade equilibrium is increasing in ￿2. So, if the crisis is accompanied by ￿ ight
to liquidity (large increase in ￿2), then market breakdowns are more persistent.
4.5.2 Role of beliefs about the crisis
Next I analyze the role of beliefs about a crisis probability. Suppose the (true) probability
of a crisis is qo but investors believe that the probability is q which could be less or greater
than qo. Let us look again at the numerical example. Suppose the probability of a crisis
is qo = 10%. Figure 9 depicts the equilibrium values of investment and expected utility as
a function of q. If a crisis is considered to be a rare event (q < 3:2%), then the economy
is in the unique equilibrium with no trade during the crisis. If investors believe q > 6:6%,
then the economy is in the unique equilibrium with market trading in both states. For
q 2 [3:2%;6:6%]; there are multiple equilibria.




















































Figure 9. Equilibrium values as a function of beliefs q.
Underestimating the crisis probability is more costly in terms of welfare than overesti-
mating it because the former may result in a market breakdown. Moreover, overestimating
the probability of a crisis may actually be welfare bene￿cial since the market equilibrium is
not e¢ cient: investors overinvest into risky assets at date t = 0 relative to the second-best
investment allocation.28 Thus, pessimistic beliefs about the crisis probability lead to larger
liquidity holdings, and may therefore improve welfare.
4.6 Equilibrium with Adverse Selection and Knightian Uncertainty
Suppose the crisis is accompanied by an unanticipated shock in period one. The shock is an
"unforeseen contingency", an event that investors are not aware of so they do not plan for
it.29 As a result of this shock, investors face Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) about the
fraction of low quality assets in the crisis state. Investors do not know the actual probability
b ￿2 of an asset being a lemon, instead they believe it belongs to some interval: b ￿2 2 [￿2;￿2]
such that ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2. Investors are assumed to have Gilboa-Schmeidler [28] maxmin
utility: U(c) = min
b ￿22[￿2;￿2]
E[log(c)].
28See section 4.7.1 for the Social Planner solution.
29Unforseen contingencies are de￿ned as "possibilities that the agent does not think about or recognize as
possibilities at the time he makes a decisison" (Lipman, The New Plagrave Dictionary of Economics 2008).
In modeling unanticipated uncertainty about the asset value, I am following Easley and O￿ Hara (2008) and
Uhlig (2009).
25This assumption does not change the investment decision made at date t = 0 since
there is no ambiguity at date t = 0. The investment allocation x is determined by the
initial beliefs ￿2 (before the unanticipated shock is realized) so that x = x(￿2). Assume
￿2 < ￿2.
Non-liquidity investors decide whether to buy assets at date t = 1 based on the worst
among possible priors: ￿2. Therefore, investors are willing to buy risky assets at t = 1
during the crisis if the market price p2,
p2 =
(1 ￿ ￿2)




is less than the (worst) expected payo⁄ b R(￿2),
b R(￿2) =
￿2(1 ￿ ￿2)
￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2
RH +
￿2
￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2
RL: (15)
Consider the case when p2 > rH, which also implies that p1 > rH. So, if there is
no ambiguity about b ￿2 (i.e., ￿2 = b ￿2 = ￿2) then there is market trading in both states.
However, with ambiguity about b ￿2, there is a breakdown of trade when ￿2 is su¢ ciently
large so that b R2(￿2) ￿ rH, i.e.,
￿2 ￿
￿2 (RH ￿ rH)
￿2RH + (1 ￿ ￿2)rH ￿ RL
: (16)
Therefore, the ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) about the fraction of low quality assets
can amplify the e⁄ect of adverse selection and cause a market breakdown.
4.7 Government
4.7.1 Social Planner
In this section, I analyze this model from the social planner perspective, and compare it
with a market equilibrium.
First-best allocation Under full information (when it is known who receives a liq-

















26Second-best allocation With asymmetric information about the quality of assets
and the identity of liquidity investors, the ￿rst-best allocation is not incentive compatible
because investors with low quality assets have the incentive to pretend to be liquidity
traders.







qs (￿s￿sk logc1k(s) + (1 ￿ ￿s)￿sk logc2k (s)) (17)
s:t: (i) ￿sc1(s) ￿ 1 ￿ x;
(ii) (1 ￿ ￿s)
X
k=L;H




(iii) c1(s) ￿ c2k (s): 8k;s
for all s = 1;2 and k = L;H.30
Since the quality of assets is not observable, all liquidity investors consume the same
amount: c1k(s) ￿ c1(s) for each k;s.31 The constraints (i) and (ii) are resource constraints
for period one and two, respectively. The constraints (iii) are incentive compatibility con-
straints. In equilibrium, constraints (v) are binding for investors with low quality assets:
c1(s) = c2L (s) in each state s.
Proposition 3 The optimal holdings of the safe asset in the incentive-compatible social
planner￿ s solution are larger than in the market equilibrium. The social planner achieves
higher aggregate welfare relative to the market equilibrium.
In the market equilibrium, investors do not take into account the e⁄ect of their invest-
ment choice on prices. This creates an externality which distorts the e¢ cient investment
allocation. In particular, this externality leads to overinvestment in risky assets that con-
tributes to the market breakdown. Due to the adverse selection, there are more assets
traded in the market at date t = 1, in particular, more assets of low quality. To absorb this





￿s if k = L
1 ￿ ￿s if k = H
8s = 1;2
31The social planner can di⁄erentiate liquidity investors with bad and good assets by o⁄ering a contract
with a lower price and a lower quantity/probability. However, such contracts are not optimal since it results
in the liquidation of some high quality assets before maturity, and therefore, leads to a loss in welfare.
27The e⁄ect of prices on expected utility depends on the investors￿type: liquidity investors
and investors with low quality assets bene￿t from higher prices, while non-liquidity investors
with high quality assets bene￿t from lower prices. Overall, the price e⁄ect evaluated at the
market equilibrium is positive32. Therefore, aggregate welfare can be improved by increasing
holdings of the safe asset which leads to higher asset prices. The social planner problem is
equivalent to the investor maximization problem when the price e⁄ect is taken into account.
As a result, a larger allocation of liquidity by social planner smooths ex-ante consumption
and increases aggregate welfare. The social planner reduces the adverse selection problem
but does not completely eliminate it.
4.7.2 Policy Implications
Ex-ante liquidity requirements The social planner solution suggests the following
policy implication: requiring ex-ante larger liquidity holdings would alleviate the adverse
selection problem and prevent the market breakdown during crises, especially if the economy
is in the multiple equilibria range. The government can require agents to hold the safe asset
at date t = 0 so that the second-best allocation is implemented.
Liquidity provision during a crisis
Tax-￿nanced liquidity provision Alternatively, the government can intervene ex-
post when the economy is in the crisis state. If the market breakdown is due to the high
liquidity preference or the low crisis probability, then liquidity provision into the market
can restore trading. Consider the situation when the economy is in the no-trade equilibrium
and the government decides to intervene. Suppose the price needs to be increased by ￿
to restore trading, then government should inject ￿ amount of liquidity such that ￿ =
￿(￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2)x. Alternatively, the government can buy ￿ amount of assets such that





. This policy is e⁄ective if the expected
payo⁄ of assets sold in the market is above the liquidation value of the high quality asset:
b R2 > rH.
32See Appendix 7.5 for the proof.
28It should be noted that there is a moral hazard problem associated with government
interventions during crises. If market participants anticipate government interventions then
the optimal holdings of risky assets are larger. Therefore, a larger intervention is required.
The moral hazard problem can be corrected if the liquidity provision at date t = 1 is
￿nanced by a tax ￿ per unit of investment, which is imposed at date t = 0. The tax ￿x
should be equal to the amount of liquidity ￿ that is required to restore market price to the
level of p2,
￿x = (￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2)xp2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ x): (18)
Imposing such tax increases liquidity holdings at t = 0 and prevents market breakdowns at
t = 1, leading to a higher expected utility.33
Numerical example To illustrate the e⁄ect of the government policy, consider the nu-
merical example. The asset return parameters are RH = 1:2; rH = 0:5;RL = rL = 0:3, the
fraction of low quality investments in the normal state is ￿1 = 0:05, the probabilities of a
liquidity shock in the normal state and in the crisis state, respectively, are ￿1 = 0:2 and
￿2 = 0:3, the probability of the crisis is q = 0:1. Figure 11a depicts the values of investment
x, prices ps and expected utility as a function of ￿2, for the market equilibrium (types I
and II), the equilibrium with government intervention (G), and the social planner solution
(second-best).

















































































Figure 11a. Equilibrium values of investment,prices and welfare as a function of ￿2.
Imposing a tax at date t = 0 to ￿nance liquidity provision at date t = 1 leads to the larger
investor￿ s holdings of liquidity at t = 0: (1￿xG) > (1￿xII). As a result, the market prices
33See Appendix 7.5 for the detailed analysis.
29are higher, and the market breakdown is avoided. Also, it leads to a higher expected utility:
EUG > EUII.
Figure 11b depicts the aggregate holdings of liquidity (L(s)), the cost of foregone payo⁄
when risky assets are sold before maturity (C(s)), and the return on assets bought on the
secondary market (Rs=ps).













































































































































Figure 11b. Equilibrium values of market liquidity and asset returns as a function of ￿2.
















. Also, the government intervention
reduces the cost of selling assets before maturity: CG
s < CII
s ; and decreases the return on
assets bought at t = 1: Rs=pG
s < Rs=pII
s . So the tax-￿nanced liquidity provision during
crises also leads to a larger market liquidity in normal times. It reduces the adverse selection
problem and improves welfare, although not as much as the social planner￿ s solution.
Liquidity injection (recapitalization) Another type of intervention is injecting
liquidity directly into ￿nancial institutions. In this case, the government can o⁄er liquidity
￿i to a ￿nancial institution i in exchange for a fraction of its future consumption ￿ictk
depending on the i￿ s type. As demonstrated earlier, an increase in liquidity holdings leads to
higher asset prices and higher expected utility. Therefore, ￿nancial institutions, especially
those in need of liquidity or those with lemons, would be willing to participate in this
exchange.34
34For some parameter values, non-liquidity investors with high quality assets may choose not to participate.
Then the welfare impact of this policy is lower.
30Asset purchases If the no-trade outcome is a result of the large fraction of lemons
in the market or Knightian uncertainty about it then it is more e⁄ective for the govern-
ment to purchase these assets. The liquidity injection is not useful since it does not a⁄ect
the expected value of assets, and therefore leads to further liquidity hoarding. Removing
such assets from the market reduces the adverse selection and uncertainty problems. In
particular, the fraction ￿ of low quality assets needs to be removed from the market in
order to restore trading
￿




. Note that if the market
breakdown is caused by a loss of con￿dence due to the ambiguity about the asset values
then government interventions can restore market con￿dence without generating the moral
hazard.
5 Model Implications and the Financial Crisis
5.1 Financial Crisis of 2007-2009
In the recent crisis of 2007-2009, ￿nancial institutions held a signi￿cant amount of asset
backed securities (ABS). These securities had skewed payo⁄s: they had high expected return
prior to the crisis but incurred substantial losses during the crisis. In particular, the haircut
on ABS increased from 3-5% in August 2007 to 40-50% in August 2008 (Gorton and Metrick
[30]). Furthermore, the demand for ABS collapsed from over $500 billion in 2007 to $20
billion in 2009 (see Figure 12 taken from Adrian, Ashcraft, and Pozsar (2010)).
Financial institutions were exposed to systemic risk through securities holdings which
had skewed payo⁄s: they produced high returns in normal times but incurred substantial
losses during the crisis. Before the crisis, many of these created securities were rated AAA,
which implied a minimal risk of default. In particular, these assets were considered very
liquid: if needed, these securities could be sold at a fair market price. During the crisis,
the value of securities became more sensitive to private information. When in February
2007 subprime mortgage defaults increased, triggering the liquidity crisis, a large fraction
of these securities were downgraded.35 The impact of declining housing prices on securities
35For example, 27 of the 30 tranches of asset-backed CDOs underwritten by Merrill Lynch in 2007 were
downgraded from AAA ratings to ￿junk￿(Coval, Jurek and Sta⁄ord [20]).
31depended on the exact composition of assets and mortgages that backed them. Due to
the complexity of structured ￿nancial products and heterogeneity of the underlying asset
pool, owners had an informational advantage in estimating how much those securities were
worth.36
Figure 12. Demand for ABS in 2007 and 2009.
The asymmetric information about the assets￿value leads to the lemons problem: a
buyer does did not know whether the seller is selling the security because of a sudden need
for liquidity, or because the seller is trying to unload the toxic assets. The adverse selection
issue can cause market freezes re￿ ecting buyers￿beliefs that most securities o⁄ered for sale
are of low quality.37
Also, as market condition worsened, investors￿value for liquidity had increased. Finan-
36This problem was especially pronounced with the junior equity tranches (a.k.a. "toxic waste"). These
tranches were hard to value since they were traded infrequently and were usually held by the issuing bank.
Moreover, these securities received overly optimistic ratings from the credit rating agencies. (Brunnermeier
[14])
37For example, Krishnamurthy [37] identi￿es adverse selection as one of the diagnoses of the recent crisis:
market participants may fear that if they transact they will be left with a "lemon". Also, Drucker and Mayer
[23] ￿nd that underwriters of prime MBS appeared to exploit access to better information when trading in
the secondary market. Elul [27] also ￿nds evidence of adverse selection in the prime mortgage market.
32cial institutions were exposed to the market liquidity risk through the maturity mismatch
of their balance sheets: they ￿nanced their long-term asset holdings with shorter maturity
instruments. Diamond and Rajan [22] and Brunnermeier [14] identify maturity mismatch as
an important factor contributing to the fragility of ￿nancial system. Because of the losses on
their assets, some banks became undercapitalized; however, their attempts to recapitalize
pushed the market price further down.38
Furthermore, market participants underestimated the systemic risk, in particular, they
failed to see the correlation of risks induced by securitization (Coval, Jurek and Sta⁄ord
[20]). Overly optimistic ratings from the credit rating agencies further contributed to mis-
assessment of systemic risk ([14]). Increasing defaults on subprime mortgages and the lack
of historical evidence caused an increase in market uncertainty about the impact of eco-
nomic shocks on the value of ￿nancial securities. According to Gorton [29], the size and
location of expected losses were not fully known because of the complexity and opaqueness
of securitization. As the safest AAA subprime tranches experienced losses, investors started
to question the valuation of models of all securitized products. This resulted in a dramatic
increase in uncertainty and investors￿panic.
5.2 Model Implications
The model captures the following important features of the ￿nancial crisis:
￿ adverse selection generated by asymmetric information about assets quality,
￿ increase in preference for liquidity which causes asset sales for exogenous reasons
(unrelated to asset returns),
￿ considering a crisis as a low probability event,
￿ uncertainty about assets￿value due to the unexpected shock.
The model demonstrates how adverse selection can lead to liquidity hoarding, increased
asset price volatility, lower trading volume and possibly to complete breakdown of trade
38Brunnermeier and Pedersen [15] refer to this phenomena as a "loss spiral" and a "margin spiral". Indeed,
Adrian and Shin [4] documented evidence of these phenomena for investments banks.
33during a crisis. Investors are exposed to systemic risk through their holdings of risky assets.
Although adverse selection is generated by idiosyncratic asymmetric information, the extent
of adverse selection depends on the aggregate state. In normal times, when the fraction of
lemons is small, adverse selection does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the market. However,
if the fraction of lemons is large or potential buyers believe it may be large, then adverse
selection can lead to a market breakdown. Furthermore, even a small amount of adverse
selection can be ampli￿ed to a full scale crisis with market freezes and liquidity hoarding39 if
it is accompanied by a ￿ ight-to-liquidity, a misassessment of systemic risk, or by uncertainty
about asset values.
In my model, I show that the ability to trade based on private information is welfare
improving if adverse selection does not lead to a market breakdown during the crisis. In
normal times, it is welfare bene￿cial, but during the crisis it may lead to signi￿cant losses if
market trading halts. Therefore, informed trading reduces the idiosyncratic risks of ￿nancial
institutions but exacerbates the systemic risk.
This result is consistent with arguments in Holmstrom [33] and Stiglitz [42] that the
problem in the recent crisis was not the lack of transparency as such but the sensitivity of
securities to systemic risk. In particular, it suggests that the increase in transparency is not
necessarily bene￿cial unless it reaches the level of full (symmetric) information. (Holmstrom
[33]).
The results can be applied to a cross-country analysis of ￿nancial crises. The model pre-
diction o⁄ers an explanation for the following observation: while capital ￿ ows into emerging
countries are often speculative and volatile, capital ￿ ows into the US are mostly nonspec-
ulative and driven by a search for safe assets (Caballero and Krishnamurthy [18]).40 The
countries with a history of rare ￿nancial crises tend to have less aggregate liquidity holdings
relative to (illiquid) long-term investment. In these countries, if the crisis does occur then
it is more severe and more likely to be accompanied by market freezes. On the other hand,
countries that are more prone to ￿nancial crises have more aggregate liquidity holdings
39Indeed, the size of subprime market were small compared to the total ABS market. In 2007, subprime
issuance about 30% of the total non-agency MBS issuance. (BIS Quarterly Review, December 2007)
40Furthermore, Acharya and Schnabl [2] show that global banking ￿ ows, not just global imbalances,
determined the geography of the ￿nancial crisis.
34which alleviates the crisis.41 In the model (Figure 7), an economy where crises are accom-
panied by a market breakdown but do not occur often has a higher expected utility than
an economy with more frequent crises but without market breakdowns. In the former case,
government interventions can restore market trading and further increase welfare.
Also, the model can be applied to the credit markets by changing the initial assumption:
investors borrow ! units of good at t = 0 (instead of receiving it as an endowment) and have
to repay it at date t = 1 with probability ￿ (else they repay it at t = 2). Then in period
one investors who have not received a liquidity shock are creditors, and liquidity investors
are borrowers. The risky asset is used as a collateral in the credit market. In this setting,
the cost C(s) =
b Rs￿ps
b Rs
corresponds to the haircut on asset expected value b Rs. This cost
is larger in the crisis than in the normal state and it is increasing with amount of adverse
selection in the market.
5.3 Policy Responses
In the market equilibrium, the investment allocation is not constrained e¢ cient since ￿-
nancial markets are subject to the following two frictions: asymmetric information about
investment quality and liquidity risk. Financial institutions do not take into account the
e⁄ect of their investment choices on the market prices. As a result, they overinvest into
risky illiquid assets (relative to the constraint e¢ cient allocation), which creates systemic
externalities.42
The ine¢ ciency of a market equilibrium provides a rationale for government interven-
tions to alleviate the crisis and ex-ante regulation targeted to prevent market freezes.43 The
appropriate policy response during the crisis depends on which ampli￿cation mechanism(s)
41This is consistent with empirical evidence that bank liquidity is countercyclical (Acharya, Shin, and
Yorulmazer [3])
42For example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy [18] argue that the aggregate shortage of safe assets was one
of the key factors contributing to the ￿nancial crisis.
43Indeed, during the crises, central banks in advanced economies intervened on an unprecedented scale.
Some central banks used unconventional measures such as providing liquidity to banks on extraordinary
terms and at longer maturities, and intervening in selected credit markets to support secondary market
liquidity. As a result, central banks￿balance sheets expanded signi￿cantly. For example, the balance sheet
of the Federal Reserve exceeded 15% of GDP in 2009 relative to 6% of GDP in 2007 and 2008 (IMF, IFS).
35cause the breakdown of trade. If it is due to a ￿ ight-to-liquidity or an underestimating of
systemic risk, then liquidity provision through open market operations or direct injection
of liquidity into ￿nancial institutions can restore asset trading. However, if the no-trade
outcome is a result of a large fraction of lemons in the market or uncertainty about it, then
the liquidity provision is not e¢ cient and leads to further liquidity hoarding.44 In this case,
it is more e⁄ective to purchase the most illiquid assets. Removing such assets from the
market reduces adverse selection and uncertainty problems.45
There is a moral hazard problem associated with government interventions during crises:
if market participants anticipate a government intervention then the optimal holdings of
risky assets are larger. For example, Kocherlakota [36] argues that during crises government
bailouts are inevitable, and these bailouts (debt guarantees) lead to the ine¢ cient allocation
of capital towards risky investments. He proposes to use taxes to address the resulting
risk externalities. Financing government liquidity injection by imposing an ex-ante tax
on ￿nancial institutions corrects the moral hazard problem and increases market liquidity.
Another preemptive policy response is an ex-ante requirement of larger liquidity (safe asset)
holdings, which corrects the systemic externalities and prevents market breakdowns during
crises.
6 Conclusion
I analyze the e⁄ect of adverse selection in the asset market. Asymmetric information about
asset returns generates the lemons problem when buyers do not know whether the asset
is sold because of its low quality or because the seller￿ s sudden need for liquidity. Market
trading based on asymmetric information allows ￿nancial institutions to reduce idiosyncratic
44As noted by Bernanke (2008), traditional liquidity provision was inadequate for addressing the strains
in short-term funding markets. For example, despite massive liquidity injections by Federal Reserve, many
over-the-counter markets continued to experience liquidity problems (BIS (2008)).
45This is consistent with arguments about the e⁄ectiveness of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
TARP was originally established to buy ￿troubled assets￿ from ￿nancial institutions in order to restore
their ￿nancial solvency. However, as has been extensively noted, there were various implementation issues
associated with it. Ultimately, the funds ($700 billion) were used for direct capital injections into ￿nancial
institutions and for other purposes.
36risks, but it exacerbates their exposure to systemic risk. In normal times, adverse selection
does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect market liquidity. However, when the economy is in a crisis,
adverse selection may lead to market freezes and liquidity hoarding.
Further, I examine the following ampli￿cation mechanisms: an increase in liquidity pref-
erences, underestimating the likelihood of a crisis, and ambiguity about the fraction of low
quality assets. Any of these phenomena can amplify the e⁄ect of adverse selection, leading
to increased asset price volatility, ￿re-sale pricing and possibly to a breakdown of trade dur-
ing crises. The government can mitigate adverse selection problems and increase aggregate
welfare by requiring larger holdings of safe liquid assets. The choice and e⁄ectiveness of
policy responses during a crisis depends on which ampli￿cation mechanisms cause market
freezes.
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(i) ) there is always positive holding of risky asset
(ii) ) there is always trade in the crisis state without adverse selection
(iii) )in the crisis state price is always determined by market clearing conditions, hence, p2 < R2
7.2 Equilibrium without Adverse Selection
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42case 2: p1 = R1;p2 ￿ R2
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1￿￿ R1+1 so that market clearing condition in state s = 1 is satis￿ed.
First-Best investment and consumption allocations:
investment : x





































qs (1 ￿ ￿s)
7.3 Equilibrium with Adverse Selection
7.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Type I equilibrium
Let us start with a type I equilibrium with market trading in both states. The investors￿maximization
problem is given by







xps + (1 ￿ x)b Rs=ps
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿s)log
￿
xRH + (1 ￿ x)b Rs=ps
￿￿
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This is a monotonically decreasing function of x. At x = 0, F is greater than 0 and at x = 1, F is less
than zero. Therefore, by Intermediate Function Theorem, there exist a unique x
￿ such that at F (x) = 0
The x
￿ can be derived as a root to a cubic equation:a1x
3 + a2x
2 + a3x + a4 = 0, where a1 = ￿d1d2;
a2 = d1d2d3 ￿((1 ￿ ￿1)q1￿1 + 1)d2 ￿((1 ￿ ￿2)q2￿2 + 1)d1; a3 = (d1 + d2)d3 ￿1+(1 ￿ ￿1)q1￿1 (d2 ￿ 1)+
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Denote the solution as x
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1 = b R1, and (x
￿; p
￿
2) are determined by
(i) : q1F1(x
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x￿ > b R2 then p
￿
2 = b R2 and
by assumption 3, p
￿
1 = b R1. Hence, equilibrium investment x




￿; b Rs) = 0.
If p
￿
2 ￿ rh then in the crisis state liquidity traders with high quality investment choose to liquidate their
investment rather than selling it at t = 1. Therefore, the expected return b R2 = Rl, so there no demand for





2) cannot be an equilibrium investment and prices if p
￿
2 ￿ rh.
If ￿2 and ￿2 are su¢ ciently large such that p
￿
2 ￿ rh then the type I does no longer exist. Fs (x) is
decreasing in ￿s and ￿s: Also, Fs (x) is decreasing in x. Hence, x is decreasing in ￿s and ￿s. If p
￿
2 is
44determined by cash-in-the-market-pricing then the e⁄ect of an increase in ￿2 or ￿2 on the price in state






































Therefore, increase in ￿2 and/or ￿2can lead to the decrease in p
￿
2, potentially resulting in p
￿
2 ￿ rH: If
p
￿
2 = b R2 then it is again decreasing in ￿2 but increasing in ￿2, however, if ￿2 increases su¢ ciently then
cash-in-the-market-pricing binds and p
￿
2 becomes decreasing function of ￿2.
The consumption allocation of early and late consumers in a type I equilibrium are given by
c1(s) = (1 ￿ x
￿)
1 + (1 ￿ ￿s)￿s
￿s + (1 ￿ ￿s)￿s
c2L(s) = (1 ￿ x
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s:t (i) 0 ￿ x ￿ 1
(ii) p1 > rh
Therefore, an investment allocation x and market prices ps are determined by the following equations:
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rH ￿ 1
xrH + (1 ￿ x)
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RH ￿ 1
xRH + (1 ￿ x)
￿
If price p1 is determined by cash-in-the-market, then G(x) is a decreasing function in x, and it is
positive at x = 0 and negative at x = 1. Therefore, a solution x
￿￿ : G(x
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x￿￿ > b R1,
then p
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1 = b R1 and x
￿￿ : q1F1(x
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1 > rh. Hence, there is always market trading in the normal state. Also,




x￿￿ < rh, i.e., there is indeed no market trading during the crisis.






x￿￿(￿2;￿2) (this is an implied price in the crisis
state, it is hypothetical since there no market trading). This hypothetical price p
￿￿
2 is decreasing in ￿2 and
￿2. Therefore, if ￿2 and ￿2 are su¢ ciently small such that p
￿￿
2 > rh then the type II does not exist.
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Multiple Equilibria
The equilibria of type I and II coexist for ￿2 and ￿2 such that p
￿
2 (￿2;￿2) > rh ￿ p
￿￿
2 (￿2;￿2). Consider
a type I equilibrium investment allocation x
￿. It can be shown that G(x





2 (￿2;￿2) < p
￿
2 (￿2;￿2). Therefore, there is a possibility that p
￿
2 (￿2;￿2) > rh ￿ p
￿￿
2 (￿2;￿2).
The expected utility is higher when there is a market trading in both states. Consider investment
allocation in type II equilibrium x




















Therefore, type I equilibrium is ex-ante Pareto dominant. However, type I equilibrium is not ex-post Pareto
dominant since investor with high quality asset have higher expected utility in the normal state in type II
relative to type I equilibrium: c
I
2H (s = 1) < c
II
2H (s = 2).
7.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Denote investment allocation in an equilibrium without adverse selection by x
0, and investment
allocations in type and I and II equilibrium with adverse selection by x
￿ and x
￿￿,respectively. Similarly,
denote expected utility in state s for an equilibrium without adverse selection by Vs (x
0), and for type and







46It can be shown that for 8s = 1;2 : Fs(x
=;ps(x






￿); and functions Fs and G2 are decreasing in x.
Consider the di⁄erence in expected welfare V





































































0) ￿ V (x
0), i.e., ability to trade
based on private information increases the expected utility if there is market trading in both states.
Next, consider the di⁄erence in expected welfare V
II￿V in state s = 2: Given the investment allocation,
all types of investors consume less in the crisis state in a type II (no-trade) equilibrium than in an equilibrium
without adverse selection: c
II
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￿￿) ￿ V1(x0) > 0:
Therefore, informed trading leads to the welfare gains in the normal state: V
II
1 (x
￿￿) > V1(x0) and welfare







. The ex-ante e⁄ect depends on the probability of the crisis state.
De￿ne, ￿V ￿ V
II(x









￿￿) ￿ Vs (x
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￿
. For q = 0; V
II(x
￿￿) > V (x0) and for q = 1;
V
II(x
￿￿) < V (x0). Therefore, 9e q 2 (0;1) : 8q < e q; V
II(x
￿￿) > V (x0) and 8q > e q; V
II(x
￿￿) > V (x0) since
￿V is linear in q.
7.4 Comparative Statics
7.4.1 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. First consider an equilibrium with trade in both states. The equilibrium investment allocation is
determined from the following equation:
X
s=1;2
qsFs (x;ps) = 0 (Fs (x;ps) is de￿ned in the proof of Proposition
1). Fs(x;ps) is decreasing in ￿s, therefore,
X
s=1;2




decreasing in x. Hence, the solution x
￿ is decreasing in q. If the prices are determined by cash-in-the-market
constraint, then the prices p
￿
s are increasing in q. Also, the expected utility V
I decreases as q becomes
larger.
Now consider an equilibrium with the market breakdown in the crisis state. If we compute x0 such
that G2 (x
0) = 0 and x
00 such that F1 (x
00;p1(x
00)) = 0 then x
00 > x
￿￿ > x
0. The equilibrium x
￿￿ is
47determined by G(x;p1) = (1 ￿ q)F1 (x;p1) + qG2 (x;p2) = 0. Since G is decreasing in x then the optimal
x







￿￿), as q becomes larger the expected utility V
II decreases. The market breaks down when the
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￿
de￿ned in the proof of Proposition 1 . The increase in q may increase
p
￿￿
2 su¢ ciently to restore the trading.
Consider some q such that p
￿￿
2 = rH ￿ " with " > 0., so there is no trading in state 2. Therefore,
F2(x
￿￿;p2) > G2 (x
￿￿) = 0. If q increases su¢ ciently so that x





















then the trading in the crisis state restores.
7.5 Government
7.5.1 Proof of Proposition 3






qs (￿s logc1(s) + (1 ￿ ￿s)(￿s logc2L(s) + (1 ￿ ￿s)logc2H(s)))g
s:t: (i) (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿s)￿c1(s) = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ x)
(ii) (1 ￿ ￿)￿c2(s) = (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿s)xb R
(iii) c1(s) = ￿c1(s) + (1 ￿ x)
(iv) c2L(s) = ￿c1(s) + ￿c2(s)
(v) c2H(s) = xRH + ￿c2(s)
(vi) c1 ￿ xrH + (1 ￿ x)
(vii) c2H ￿ xRH + (1 ￿ x)
(viii) c2L ￿ c1
(ix) ￿ct(s) ￿ 0
where ￿c1(s) is a transfer of cash holdings to liquidity investors in exchange of their risky asset holdings
at date t = 1 and ￿c2(s) is a transfer of risky asset holdings in exchange for cash holding to non-liquidity
traders. The social planner problem is set up so that it is comparable with a market equilibrium, i.e., the
planner does not have any additional advantages over market. For example, a partial pooling equilibrium is
explicitly ruled out. Note, even though it may be feasible for the planner to di⁄erentiate liquidity investors
with bad and good assets by o⁄ering a contract with a lower price and a lower quantity or probability, it is
not optimal because of a loss in welfare due to the premature liquidation of some high quality assets.



















































(1￿￿) rh + 1
￿￿1
The optimal investment x is a solution to the following equation H (x) ￿
X
s=1;2













b Rs ￿ 1
￿













This is a monotonically decreasing function of x. At x = 0, H is greater than 0 and at x = 1, H is less
than zero. Therefore, by Intermediate Function Theorem, there exist a unique x
o such that at H (x
o) = 0
The x
o can be derived as a root to a cubic equation.
Furthermore at x = 1￿￿; we have H(x) < 0 which implies that x
o < 1￿￿, i.e., the investment allocation
in the incentive compatible equilibrium is smaller than the ￿rst-best investment allocation. Denote the
optimal expected utility by V
o: To compare welfare achieved by social planner with a market equilibrium.
If prices are determined by cash-in-the-market constraints then the expected utility in a market equilibrium











1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿s
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿s
￿


























￿) ￿ V (x
￿) ￿ V
o since x
o = argmaxV (x), i.e., the social planner always achieves a











￿)= 0, i.e., the investment allocation in a market equilibrium is larger
than the social planner investment allocation.









￿￿). Therefore, the social
solution is not ex-post Pareto dominant.
Price e⁄ect From market clearing, we have
@ps








1 ￿ x + psx
+ (1 ￿ ￿s)
 
￿s
x ￿ (1 ￿ x)b Rs=p
2
s
xps + (1 ￿ x)b Rs=ps




xRH + (1 ￿ x)b Rs=ps
!!
49At market equilibrium investment allocation, we have
@EU
@ps jx=x￿ > 0. Hence,
@EU
@ps jx=x￿ @ps
@x jx=x￿ < 0,
i.e., by decreasing investment allocation, we can increase expected utility.
7.5.2 Government Intervention




x < rh . Then the government




(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ x) +￿
(￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2) x
= rh +"
) ￿ =(rh + ")(￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2) x￿(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ x)
Total amount of liquidity intervention: ￿ = (rh + ")(￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2)x ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ x) . Tax (per unit
of investment) imposed on investors at date t = 0, to ￿nance liquidity provision at t = 0 :
￿ = p
G
2 (￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)
(1 ￿ x)
x








1 ￿ x + p
G


































2 (￿2+(1￿￿2)￿2)+(1￿￿2) ￿ x ￿ 1













2 = rh + ":
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